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Abstract 
 
 Ensuring privacy on the Internet is one of the most daunting challenges that we presently 
face.  Crowds is the implementation of an approach to provide privacy to web transactions. The 
system’s strategy is to seek concealment through numbers. A crowd consists of a collection of users 
that intend to participate in web exchanges; each user being represented by a process on their 
machine called a jondo. The jondo either submits the request to the server or forwards it to another 
jondo. The randomly achieved sequence of jondos that traverse the distance from the initiator to the 
server provides degrees of anonymity. The present version of Crowds employs HTTP as its sole 
protocol to secure anonymity with the exception of embedded protocols. It is the intention of this 
thesis to extend this system’s capability by adding the FTP protocol to its cache of viable protocols 
traversing the Crowd’s implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
  In the March 2001 issue of PC World the following account was given: In 1994, a loan officer for a 
bank who also served on his county’s health board discovered that he had free access to the patient 
records of people who lived in his county. He cross-referenced the names from his customer databases 
with the names of people who had been diagnosed with terminal illnesses. The banker called due the 
loans of dozens of people who had been diagnosed with cancer. 
 
 In 1998 an employee of Motorola received startling news at work: She had been automatically 
enrolled in an anti depression counseling program by the company’s human resources department. 
Eventually, the company admitted that they had received a list of drugs her mail-order prescription 
company was sending her on a regular basis. Included on the list was a prescription antidepressant. 
 
Data collection is ubiquitous in today’s society and it seems that every transaction we participate 
in is recorded. The profiles and dossiers compiled using the influx of analytical tools available is certainly 
evident relative to the Internet. Currently, Internet communications do not conform to established 
practices, since traditionally the invasion of privacy relative to mail and telephone communications are 
prohibited without judicial intervention.  There is certain information the corporate and consumer worlds 
deem confidential and do not want shared. Certain financial information, private medical and health 
concerns, participation in support groups pertaining to chemical dependency problems, and corporate 
trade secrets are just some areas in which concealment is desired. The preservation of privacy involves 
the concealment of message content and inhibiting the detection of the sender and associated receiver. 
Arguments concerning Internet privacy will be entertained for many years to come, but most people would 
agree with one point, however; total lack of privacy is not something desired.  In light of commercial 
concerns, consumers’ privacy, the nation’s security, and many other variables, a balance between an 
individual’s privacy and the preservation of our society should be sought. 
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  The following scenario should illustrate that encryption of a message will not suffice for every 
circumstance in which privacy is sought. SSH, PGP and other available software technologies may not 
achieve the degree of privacy desired. An individual discovers unethical or even criminal activity at his 
place of employment. Unable to ignore what he has seen for his job sake and embrace some form of 
rationalization to justify this ignorance, he decides to act.  He sends the appropriate authorities an e-mail 
thinking his identity would be safe since the message was encrypted. The local administrator, colluding 
with the perpetrators, sees that he has sent an email to unethical.com. Even though the message was 
encrypted, sender or receiver anonymity is preferred. The employee would be safe if the administrator did 
not know which employee sent the message (sender anonymity) or if the administrator did not know who 
was the recipient of the message (receiver anonymity).  
 
 
1.1 Approaches to anonymous web transactions 
 
1.1.1 Proxies 
 
1.1.1.1 Anonymizer 
 
 
 There are currently two basic approaches for achieving anonymous web transactions. One widely 
known method is to insert a proxy between the initiator and the receiver of the message, thus; concealing 
the identity of the sender. Web pages are retrieved by the proxy, acting as an intermediary, and 
forwarded to the sender. The IP address of the proxy is revealed to the Web site and the address of the 
sender is secure. In some cases the content can also be encrypted between the host and the Web site. 
An area of concern relative to the anonymizing agent is that anonymizer has to be a trusted third party, 
since the sender’s address is clearly seen by the anonymizer and the user’s actions can be logged by the 
agent’s own ISPs. 
 
 Remember all connections are logged, the Web site, the proxy, and your own ISP, therefore; 
traceable if the proxy reveals its data. Any passive attacker who compromises the agent has the ability to 
monitor and record all communication between the sender and receiver. 
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The proxy also is a single point of failure, all private communication ceases if the proxy discontinues 
functioning properly. The well known proxy ‘Anonymizer’ [1] (ref. Figure 1) applies this technique. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  A typical proxy system 
 
1.1.1.2 Lucent Personalized Web Assistant 
 
  The Lucent Personalized Web Assistant [2] is also a HTTP proxy (ref. Figure 2) with a desirable 
twist; it provides an effective method for generating aliases and other features for Web services while 
securing your personal information. Many Web sites offer newsletters, discounts, confirmation codes, and 
other personalized information in exchange for usernames, secret passwords, email addresses, and other 
personal information. It can be easily seen that extensive profiles of individuals can be developed who 
frequently peruse their sites. The Lucent Personalized Web Assistant software system consists of three 
components: the Persona Generator, the Browser Proxy, and the Email Forwarder. The Persona 
Generator requires a valid email address and arbitrary password from the user and generates an alias 
username, password, and email address for the Web site of interest.  Aliases provided by LPWA, remain 
constant on all subsequent visits to that particular site.  The Browser Proxy provides filtering for certain 
HTTP headers and serves as a proxy. The Email Forwarder routes email addressed to the alias email 
address to the genuine email address of the user. Once again the pseudonym agent (LPWA) has to be a 
trusted third party and is a single point of failure. 
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Figure 2: Lucent Personalized Web Assistant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2 Onion Routing 
 
  The second approach for realizing anonymous web transactions is to employ mixes. A mix is a 
store and forward device that accepts a number of fixed-length messages from numerous sources, 
performs cryptographic transformations on the messages, and then forwards the messages to the next 
destination in a random order [5]. The mix can be considered an enhanced proxy. It conceals the sender 
from the receiver and also provides unlinkability against a global eavesdropper. Unlinkability between 
sender and receiver signifies that one can not ascertain whether the sender and receiver are 
communicating with one another even though it can be verified they are participants in transmission of 
messages. Since a mix accepts a number of fixed-length messages from various sources in a fixed time 
interval, it would be an arduous task to track messages based on bit-pattern or size. The subsequent 
random submission of these messages to there next destination makes it difficult to track the messages 
by ordering. Routing the messages through a multitude of mixes would enhance the unlinkability between 
sender and receiver.  
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  Onion Routing [3] applies this technique(mixes) to camouflage communication over the Internet. 
The infrastructure provided by onion routing protects the system against traffic analysis attacks, the ability 
to detect the sender and corresponding receiver. This system concentrates on connection anonymity, the 
concealment of the identity of the user by disguising the path between the sender and receiver. 
 
Initiator
Onion Router
Application
Proxy
Onion Proxy
Onion Router
Onion Router Onion Router
Onion Router
Entry Funnel Exit Funnel Des tination Host
Figure 3: Onion Routing 
 
  The system consists of a number of dynamically constructed connections within a network of 
mixes. The network of onion routers contain routers that act as entry funnels for client connections to the 
network. Other routers function as exit funnels that provide the generation of TCP connections to the 
designated Internet services. The client application initiates an anonymous connection by establishing a 
link with the application proxy which accepts a protocol-specific proxy and converts the data stream into 
an application-independent format accepted by the onion routing network. The packets are then 
forwarded to an onion proxy that constructs and manages the anonymous connections. The onion proxy 
constructs an onion, a multiply encrypted layered structure containing routing information, and then 
proceeds to the entry funnel. 
 
  The funnel receives the onion, decrypts it, and determines from the information provided the next 
hop in the route. The decrypted layer is removed and the process is repeated until the exit funnel is 
encountered. At this point the packet is identical to the original message and delivered to the destination 
host.  
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 1.1.3 Crowds 
   
  Crowds (ref. Figure 4) is the implementation of another approach to increase privacy during web 
transactions.  This method employs the concept of concealment through numbers. A crowd consists of a 
collection of users that intend to participate in web transactions. Each user runs a process on their 
machine called a jondo. The jondo represents a faceless participant in the gathering that seeks anonymity 
in their web exchanges. The web client configures the faceless ally as its proxy in web communications. 
All requests submitted from the browser are sent directly to the jondo. The jondo either submits the 
request directly to the web server or forwards the message to another jondo in the crowd. The randomly 
achieved sequence of jondos that traverse the distance from the initiator to the server is known as the 
path (ref. Fig. 4). In this protocol, it can not be determined if a jondo’s predecessor is the initiator of the 
request or just forwarding the request. Communication between any two jondos is encrypted using a 
shared key, known only to those jondos. Eventually the request is submitted to the server in plaintext 
form. All subsequent messages generated by that jondo traverse the same path until a new jondo is 
accepted into the crowd. 
 
  Therefore, Crowds offers another approach to maximize privacy on the web.  Crowds prevents 
the receiver, the web server, from acquiring identifying information, even the IP address and domain. 
Request headers, inherent in the HTTP protocol, that reveal certain data and minimize privacy can be 
extracted from the messages. Crowds conceal the sites visited by the user. Crowds also takes measures 
to conceal this information from other collaborating jondos. 
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Figure 4: Paths in a crowd 
 
1.2 Capabilities of the different systems 
  Each system can be categorized according to connection anonymity, data anonymity or 
personalization [7]. Connection anonymity conceals the user’s identity by masking the path from the 
sender to the receiver. Data anonymity extracts information that could identify the user. Personalization 
provides methods for web site registration without revealing the initiator.  
 
  LPWA connection anonymity is considered low since the path has just one intermediary, the 
proxy. Data anonymity and personalization is high because it uses persistent aliases for user names, 
passwords and e-mail addresses. The Anonymizer data anonymity is considered high since it removes 
identifying information in the HTTP headers, extracts Java and Javascript for browsing and rewrites HTTP 
pages to enable it to request any embedded links that exist in the page. Its personalization is absent 
because of its inability to preserve data anonymity. Its connection anonymity is limited. Onion routing and 
Crowds possess a high degree of connection anonymity since their paths to the server are well disguised. 
Data anonymity and personalization were not designed into their functionality. 
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1.3 Objectives 
  My main objective is to ensure that other protocols that differ from the ‘HTTP’ protocol can be 
employed in the ‘Crowds’ implementation. Cryptographical operations, i.e. the operations involving the 
encryption schemes, must be sustained to ensure that the security analytical calculations, established by 
the original ‘Crowds’ implementation, won’t be compromised.  The analytical calculations of the original 
‘Crowds’ system are based on certain encryption schemes, which if modified, would alter the security 
calculations, a condition to avoid minimizing complications.  The ‘FTP’ protocol was chosen based on two 
striking differences between the protocols. The FTP protocol employs two parallel TCP connections to 
transfer a file, whereas; the HTTP protocol utilizes just one. The FTP protocol must also maintain state, 
whereas the HTTP protocol is stateless. The original ‘Crowds’ software system retrieves FTP requests 
only if they are embedded in a web page. 
 
  It is the intention of this thesis to compose a FTP client that can connect to a FTP server, 
examine the file system of the remote server, and retrieve text and binary files while traversing the 
Crowds implementation. The client will only use anonymous authentication to preserve user’s anonymity, 
and the client will not address FTP commands that modify the server’s file system. Modifications of the 
proxy’s code will be made since they are essential to provide access to the FTP server and ensure the 
reception of server responses. The client will be written in Perl with the graphical components employing 
the Perl ‘Tk’ module. 
 
  Additionally, I intend to develop software that will display graphically the paths of selected jondos 
from origin to destination. 
 
  I will also generate a graphical user interface which will provide the user with the effortless ability 
to load and edit configuration values relevant to the ‘Crowds’ implementation. A brief help menu will also 
be available to aid in understanding these attributes and associated values. The configuration menus 
created to accomplish this task are: the start, list, edit, and help menus. 
 
 
 8
 Chapter 2: Crowds Background 
 
2.1 Elements of the Crowds Implementation 
 
  To appreciate the complexity and intricacies of the Crowds implementation one should consider 
its individual components: the communication layer utilized by Crowds for message passing, the primary 
communication protocol, the encryption schemes employed, the blender, and the jondo. 
 
2.1.1 Crowds Communicating Layer 
new server
generates
listening socket
Socket Creation 
     Routines
new client
communication
socket
spawns clients
send now
send in immediate mode
(blocking)
send later
send in deferred mode
(queued messages)
(non-blocking 
Sending Routines
 
connect
makes a socket connection
& generates a connection
object
Connect/Disconnect 
         Routines
disconnect
closes the connection
rcv later
receive in deferred mode
(queued messages)
(non-blocking 
Receive Routines
rcv now
receive in immediate mode
(blocking)
 
 
 
Figure 5: Communication Layer 
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 set_event handler
stores/deletes callbacks &
associated sockets -- add or removes
handles from 'select' object
Event Routines
event loop
monitors sockets for any activity
and calls designated callback
when appropriate
set non blocking
utilizes fcntl, F_SetFL, F_GetFL
& O_NonBlock to set non-blocking I/O 
Blocking/Non-Blocking I/O
Routines
(assume blocking supported)
err will block
returns value indicating the
operation would block
set blocking
utilizes fcntl, F_SetFL, F_GetFL
& O_NonBlock to set blocking I/O 
 
 
Figure 6: Communication Layer 
 
 
 
The communication layer handles multiple clients by employing the ‘Select’ module and non-blocking I/O. 
The ‘select’ method in the event loop of the communication layer monitors the sockets to determine if they 
are ready for reading or writing, and if any activity is observed the appropriate callback (routine) is called.  
The ‘fcntl’ function is used to place the sockets into non-blocking mode. These two methods are used to 
avoid blocking and thus minimizing the wait time incurred by clients for access to the server. 
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 Figure 7:  The Select Method in the Event Loop 
 
2.1.2 Crowds Primary Protocol – Hypertext Transfer Protocol  
 
  HTTP is a stateless protocol in which the web server does not have to maintain any information 
about the client. The client initiates a request, the server responds, and the transaction is completed. The 
client’s request message consists of a request line, headers, and sometimes a body. 
 
Request line Headers Blank line Optional body  
The request line is subdivided into a request method, a Universal Resource Locator, and the HTTP 
version. 
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  The URL contains four elements: the retrieval protocol, the server’s address, server’s port, and 
the path to the document requested. The protocol used to retrieve the data in this version of ‘Crowds’ is 
HTTP.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
  The client (browser) begins by parsing the Universal Resource Locator, and extracting the 
components above: the protocol to be used, the hostname of the computer to be contacted over the 
network, the port number, and the document path encountered to gain access to the information 
requested.  The browser connects to the computer with the given hostname using the appropriate 
protocol. A default port number of 80 is applied if a port number is not specified. 
 
  A message is then sent by the browser to the server using the following format: 
the client’s request method, the Universal Resource Indicator, the HTTP version, the headers, and if 
required, the body. The client’s request method is a command elicited by the client to the server indicating 
the objective the client wishes to achieve. The method ‘GET’ is the primary method employed in this 
version of ‘Crowds’. Other methods available in HTTP version 1.0 are HEAD, POST, PUT, DELETE, 
TRACE, etc. The ‘GET’ method’s objective is to retrieve a document from a specified location on the 
server. 
 
  The following is an example of the ‘GET’ method: GET /example.html HTTP/1.0. The ‘GET’ 
method’s function in this case is to retrieve the document example.html at path ‘/’ using version 1.0 of the 
HTTP protocol. After this information has been sent, the headers can be sent to the server next. 
This optional information presented in the message pertains to the client’s configuration and types of 
documents that the client prefers to handle. 
 12
 The headers are subdivided into four categories: general headers, request headers, response headers, 
or entity headers. The general headers can exist in client requests or server responses.  The request 
headers convey to the server the client’s configuration and the formats of the preferred documents. 
  The response headers disclose information about the server and how it deals with requests. The 
entity headers employed in both client requests and server responses provides information about the 
entity body in the HTTP message. The entity body, which comprises the data portion of the message, is 
sent after the headers. This division is not always applicable, but is used to supply data when needed, 
such as in response to CGI programs. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: HTTP transactions 
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  The server responds utilizing the following format: the HTTP version, status code, status 
description, headers, and entity body. The following is an example of the first line of the server’s 
response: HTTP/1.0 200 OK. This line indicates the version of the HTTP protocol the server is using. It 
also conveys to the client that the request made was successful and the data requested will be sent after 
the header information. Next the server sends the necessary header information and lastly the data 
requested. 
 
2.1.3 Encryption Schemes    
 
  The Crowds implementation employs symmetric key-based algorithms: both block and stream 
algorithms. Block cipher routines are used in Crowds to generate a block cipher object and the associated 
encrypting and decrypting routines in the following instances: 
 
1) Generation and verification of the blender’s administration cipher using the blender’s administration 
 passphrase as the key providing access to the blender to manage administrative tasks. 
 
2) The block cipher is also used for communication between the blender and the jondo or for encryption 
    and decryption of requests and response keys from jondo to jondo. 
 
  The stream cipher package encompasses routines that encrypt and decrypt requests and replies 
pertaining to web transactions. The key to the request and response ciphers is a 128 byte string which is 
randomly generated. Encryption and decryption is accomplished through XORing of the plaintext. 
 
Figure 9: The Block Cipher 
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Figure 10: The Stream Cipher 
 
2.1.4 The centralized server – Blender 
 
  A centralized server known as the blender manages crowd membership. The blender governs 
admittance to the crowd, the time in which access to the crowd is permitted, and the conveyance of the 
membership list to the other crowd members. Imposing restrictions on crowd membership is essential due 
to the following consideration: the propagation of a multitude of collaborators by a single attacker which 
reduces the ability of the system to maintain protection. Due to this potential difficulty the blender controls 
access by authentication based upon a pre-established account containing the account name and 
corresponding password of each potential user. 
 
  The design of the software system requires that all of the jondo paths to the server are static. The 
impetus behind this decision is to preclude the successful attack of collaborating jondos on the system. 
The colluding jondos could increase the probability of identifying the initiating jondo by linking multiple 
paths to the same jondo.  
 
  Static paths serve as the motivating factor for the blender to impose a time for a jondo to access 
the crowd, since the correlation of any newly admitted jondo path and the new joiner can be ascertained. 
Hence, the blender sends out a join commit signal to notify all current members that the re-establishment 
of their paths from scratch is essential. The commit time is generated by the blender within fifteen minute 
intervals when newly formed paths are required. 
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  The preservation of the integrity of the crowd membership list is upheld by each member. The list 
is updated when notification of changes are received from the blender. The jondo can also revise its list to 
the most recent changes obtained by detecting jondos who have failed. 
 
  The primary drawback to this approach to group membership maintenance is that the blender is a 
trusted third party relative to key distribution and membership reporting. 
 
2.1.5 Jondo  
 
As mentioned earlier, a crowd consists of a collection of users that intend to participate in web 
transactions, in which each user runs a process on their machine called a jondo. The jondo represents a 
faceless participant in the gathering that seeks anonymity in their web exchanges. The browser must 
configure the jondo as its proxy prior to web communications. Subsequently, all requests submitted from 
the browser are sent directly to the jondo. Other values associated with the jondo must also be loaded 
prior to the commencement of web transactions. These values are contained in a configuration file on the 
user’s system. The configuration file contains the following attributes: 
 
 name = the name registered with the blender 
 password = the password registered with the blender 
 cookies = 0 
 blender = the IP address of the blender 
 bport = the blender’s port associated with the ‘Crowds’ implementation  
 jport = the jondo’s port  
 commit = 1 
 verbose = displays informative text to STDERR 
 firewall = 0 
 protocol = determines what protocol is used HTTP or FTP 
 display = visual display of the jondos paths 
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2.2 Flow of Crowds  
 
  Initially, the blender is started and listens for incoming requests.  The jondo commences 
operations by loading the values of the attributes stored in its configuration file, initiating a connection to 
the blender, and starts its own internal and external servers. The jondo’s internal server processes 
requests from the blender and other jondos, while the jondo’s external server processes messages from 
the browser. After connection to the blender is established, the jondo sends the following message to the 
blender:  
encrypted time : jondo's name : jondo's port : firewall flag
 
  Upon successful validation of the jondo by the blender,  it adds the jondo to the ‘members’ 
database file, generates shared keys to give this jondo the ability to communicate  with all of the other 
members in the crowd,   and transmits to the new member the following message: 
encrypted time = commit time = membership list  
  The membership list includes all the previously joined jondos including the new jondo and 
consists of the following:  
member_name , jondo's  IP-address : jondo's port , key ;
 
This order is repeated until all members’ data has been sent. 
 
Figure 11: New joiner connecting to blender and blender’s response 
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  The acceptance and processing of this information allows the jondo to become an effective 
participant in the crowd. The jondo is now a new_joiner and the connection to the blender is terminated. 
 
  The blender sends an update to all jondos with the exception of the new joiner. The message 
contains information relevant to the new member and permits the other members to communicate with 
the new member. This information includes the IP address and port of the new member and  
a unique key is sent to every jondo in the list for communicating with this particular jondo. 
 
  The blender prepends a blender header to the message so the jondos being updated can 
differentiate between a blender and a proxy message, connects to the internal server of each jondo, and 
transmits the following encrypted message:  
encrypted time , new jondo's port , shared key ,new jondo's IP address , new jondo's firewall flag  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Blender sends update message to current members 
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   The blender’s server listens for connection requests in the event loop. A timeout occurs if an 
event does not take place in the allotted time. The blender’s timeout handler determines if the commit 
time has been reached and sends the commit message to every jondo when the commit time is 
encountered. The blender prepends a blender header to the message and sends the following commit 
message which consists of the following entries: 
 
Figure 13: Commit signals sent to all jondos 
  If the browser tries to establish a connection with its proxy ( jondo’s external server), prior to the 
new jondo receiving the commit message from the blender, its jondo transmits the ‘display_new_joiner 
message’ to the browser which is displayed by the browser. Any subsequent messages sent from the 
browser display the same message until the commit message has been received. 
 
Figure 14: Display the new joiner message 
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  After the reception of the commit message, the new joiner’s commit status changes from 
new_joiner to normal and further processing of the message occurs.  The shift in commit status causes 
the program to check if the protocol contained in the jondo’s initial message is valid, i.e. the HTTP or FTP 
protocol. It checks whether the message is a crowd query, a request used by the user to obtain a list of all 
active jondos in the crowd. And it probes to see if previously requested images are contained in the 
image cache. If these conditions do not exist, the message is considered new, the image cache is 
cleared, and the message undergoes further processing.  
 
  Prior to the reception of the commit message from the blender, the jondos that have been 
previously browsing continue to browse. After the commit message has been transmitted and received 
then the browsing jondos commit_status changes from normal to committed. The shift in the 
commit_status triggers the jondo to display the ‘display_joining_message’ to its browser. 
 
Figure 15: Display joining message 
 
  If new material is browsed the path will be reconstructed. The motivation behind the 
reconstruction of the paths is to protect the new joiners anonymity. If the pre-existing paths remained 
static then any new path constructed would be attributed to the new joiner.  The program also checks for 
protocol validity, a crowd query message, or an image request. An absence of these conditions indicates 
a new message any pre-existing paths are destroyed, and the message undergoes further processing.  
 
  If there is only one member in the crowd a direct connection to the web server is initiated and all 
forwarding routines are bypassed.  
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Assuming the crowd is truly a crowd, more than one member, the first line of the initiating message 
consists of the following elements to maintain consistency with the HTTP protocol: 
request method url protocol version  
  The server’s address and port are extracted from the URL for the subsequent connection to the 
server. The subsequent messages from the browser via the jondo are HTTP headers followed by the 
HTTP entity body. Any unwanted headers that may impact anonymity are filtered out. The headers that 
remain are stored for image retrieval later in the process. If a jondo is randomly selected it is added to the 
path of the initiator and a connection is established with that jondo. The jondo can either select itself 
(pseudo-connection) or another jondo. 
 
  The initial message sent to the randomly selected jondo includes the ‘proxy’ header (indicates 
message source), the sending jondo’s port, the encrypted request and response keys and a mapped id of 
the sender’s path id. 
 
  Forwarding routines continue to employ randomly selected jondos to generate a path to the 
server. During this process, the system also generates stream ciphers to encrypt and decrypt requests 
and replies between jondos. This forwarding process continues until a submitting jondo is randomly 
selected by the system. The request presented to the server by the submitting jondo transmits the 
requests in plaintext. 
 
  The server delivers the appropriate message to the submitting jondo and the submitting jondo 
parses out any images contained in the web page. The  URLs of the images are stored for later submittal 
and the server’s response is concatenated and stored. After the server closes the connection, the stored 
message is encrypted and sent back to the submitting jondo’s predecessor. The connection is terminated 
and the client (submitting jondo) is disconnected. If there were any URLs of images stored they are now 
removed one by one and connection is made to the server using these URLs.  A request is made to the 
server using the URL and the same request method and stored headers. 
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   This message is sent to the server and the server responds by sending the requested image to 
the submitting jondo. This jondo in turns sends this image to the previous jondo. The message and 
images are sent using the following format: 
 
  The message is sent alone the path from one jondo to its client (previous jondo) until the 
originating jondo is reached. The originating jondo removes the separators and submits the original 
server’s response to the browser. 
 
  If the web page contains embedded URLs (e.g. images) the browser sends these requests to its 
jondo. The browser’s jondo does not forward the requests on the path but waits for the contents of the 
request to return and then transmits the contents to the browser to prevent timing attacks.  
 
2.3 Goals and Security Considerations 
 
 
2.3.1 Types of Anonymity   
 
  As discussed in [7] there are three types of anonymity:  sender anonymity, receiver anonymity, 
and unlinkability of sender and receiver.  Sender anonymity means that the identity of the sender is 
hidden. Receiver anonymity signifies that the identity of the receiver is hidden. Unlinkability of sender and 
receiver means that a communication link between the sender and receiver cannot be determined even 
though it is known that both are participants in some communication. 
 
2.3.2 Types of Attackers   
   
A local eavesdropper can minimize privacy since this attacker observes all communication originating 
from the user’s computer. 
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Collaboration among the jondos can be a detriment to anonymous communication by combining their 
data and departing from the prescribed rules of communication.  Combination of these attackers can also 
exist to negate privacy. 
 
2.3.3 The Degree of Anonymity(Figure 16)   
 
The degree of anonymity is viewed as an informal continuum with six defined areas 
(Continuum references sender anonymity):  
 
Absolute Privacy -----  exists when the presence of communication by the sender cannot be 
       detected. 
 
Beyond Suspicion ----  defined when communication is observed, but the initiator can not be 
       distinguished from any other potential communicator. 
 
Probable Innocence --  the realm in which the communicator might be somewhat suspect, the 
        attacker is unable to have greater than 50% confidence that any node 
        initiated the message. 
 
Possible Innocence --  the region in the continuum where there is a significant probability that  
       Someone else is responsible. 
 
Exposed   -----------       indicates the identity of the sender has been compromised. 
 
Provably Exposed ---  communicator can be identified and proven to others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Degrees of Anonymity 
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2.3.4 Anonymity Properties provided by Crowds  
 
  
 
 
 
Table 1: Anonymity Properties of Crowds 
 
  
  As discussed in [6] the system does not offer sender anonymity in reference to a local 
eavesdropper since the local attacker observes all communication originating from the user’s computer 
and, hence; its degree of anonymity is exposed. 
 
  There are two cases to consider when analyzing receiver anonymity in reference to the local 
eavesdropper as the attacker. In the first scenario the initiating jondo is the submitting jondo and the 
message passed to the server is in plaintext, thereby; revealing the server’s identity to the local 
eavesdropper, since the attacker can read all messages from the initiator. The probability that the jondo is 
the submitting jondo is 1 divided by the number of members in the crowd, thus; the probability that the 
initiating jondo is the submitting jondo is inversely proportional to the crowd size. The second case occurs 
when the initiator is not the submitting jondo and all requests emanating from the jondo are encrypted and 
the anonymity of the receiver is not compromised, since the local eavesdropper cannot ascertain the 
receiver’s identity. It can be clearly seen that the first scenario is the weakest relative to receiver 
anonymity but still suggests that the probability of ‘beyond suspicion’  approaches 1 as the crowd size 
approaches infinity. 
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   In reference to aggressive behavior from the end server, receiver anonymity is obviously non-
existent. The end server can not predict which member is the path initiator since all of the members have  
an equal possibility of being the initiator, therefore;  sender anonymity is beyond suspicion. 
 
  In regards to an alliance of corrupt jondos,  receiver anonymity would be compromised if one 
or more of the collaborators were participants in the path, since the plaintext of messages are routed 
through path members.  The paper derived a theorem based on probability which stated that the path 
initiator had ‘probable innocence’  against ‘c’ collaborators if  n ≥ ( pf / pf  - 1/2 ) ( c + 1 ) 
 where ‘pf’ is the probability of forwarding, ‘c’ denotes the number of collaborators, and ‘n’ indicates the 
number of members in the crowd. This equation indicates that if the probability of forwarding is high, the 
number of collaborators that can be tolerated approaches half the crowd and still ensures ‘probable 
innocence’ for the path initiator. If the probability of forwarding is close to one-half then collaborator 
tolerance is decreased if  ‘probable innocence’ for the initiator is to be maintained. The equation also 
suggests that as n → ∞ the probability that a collaborator exists on the path approaches zero, if c and pf  
are held constant. The supposition that collaborators cannot monitor a path they do not occupy leads us 
to the conclusion that the probability of ‘absolute privacy’ approaches ‘1’ as ‘n’ approaches infinity for 
sender and receiver anonymity.  
 
  Timing considerations were also discussed and have a direct bearing on the code. Inherently, 
HTML is a language whose web pages can contain embedded urls of images. 
When the user’s browser receives a web page that contain these urls it automatically issues  subsequent 
request(s) to acquire these embedded images. The prompt request with a brief duration  may indicate to 
a collaborator that its predecessor is the initiating jondo. To preclude this timing attack the implementation 
causes the submitting jondo to parse out the embedded urls for the images and  subsequently request 
them from the server and send them along the same path back to the initiating client. 
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2.4 Empirical data measuring performance by the implementers 
 
 
  The equipment and software involved in measuring performance in the AT&T research lab [6] 
were 150 MHZ Sparc 20 machines containing the SunOS operating systems. The browser employed for 
this activity was Netscape 3.01 configured to allow four simultaneous network connections. The Apache 
web server was utilized on a 130 MHZ SGI workstation running Iris 5.3.   Figures 17 & 18 show the 
results that the lab achieved while retrieving web pages without the additional overhead of embedded 
images. Figure 21 displays the documented results of recovering web pages with embedded images. The 
variables in figure 14 are page size, in kilobytes, the path length (number of jondos in the path) , and the 
mean latency in milliseconds. Jondos appearing repeatedly on the path are counted for each time they 
appear in the path length. 
 
 An empirical result that is manifested when the path length increases from one to two results from the 
fact that encryption starts at page length two. When only one jondo is in the crowd that particular jondo 
makes a direct connection to the server and hence encryption does not occur. To impede the overhead of 
encryption a path key is employed. The hindrance to an increase in latency and thus in performance 
results from the path key being able to allow the initiating jondo to encrypt the requests and the submitting 
jondo to decrypt the message. The reversal of this procedure occurs with the server responses, the 
submitting jondo encrypts the replies and the initiating jondo  decrypts the message. All of the  
intermediate jondos are not involved  in these cryptographic processes and thus latency is minimized. 
 
 Encryption overhead is more of a detriment when embedded images are retrieved (Fig. 19). AT&T 
labs used 1-kilobyte images on the same server for their test. The serial transmission of the images was 
also mentioned as a factor that increased latency as opposed to other browsers that retrieve images 
concurrently. 
 
 
 
  
 26
 
 
Figure 17: Performance Graph without embedded images 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Performance Data without embedded images 
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Figure 18: Performance Graph without embedded images 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Performance Graph with embedded images 
 
 
 
Table 3: Performance Data with embedded images 
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Chapter 3: Jondos Configuration menus 
 
 
  To provide the user with the ability to load and edit the jondos configuration values efficiently, I 
have generated a graphical user interface. The configuration menus created to accomplish this task are: 
the Start, List, Edit, and Help menus. A brief Help menu will also be available to aid in understanding 
these attributes and associated values. 
 
  When the program is invoked, the List, Edit, Help, and Exit buttons (ref. Figure 20) are generated 
and associated with their corresponding routines. Each aforementioned buttons in the initial window 
invokes a routine which produces a new window and also disables the button producing the effect. 
Disabling the button inhibits the production of multiple windows while the procedure is being executed. 
 
  The List procedure (ref. Figure 21) loads the attributes and corresponding values from the 
configuration file. The attributes and values are displayed in a scrolled listbox and a Dismiss button is 
provided to withdraw the window from view. 
 
  The Edit routine (ref. Figure 22) exists in a scrolled text area that provides the capability to edit 
the values of the associated configuration attributes. The attributes are displayed on left justified labels in 
the text area and the values of the attributes are exhibited in right justified entry widgets. The entry 
widgets allow the user to revise the values. The Save button stores the information with the attributes and 
values passed by reference and deposited into an array which is saved in the configuration file of that 
jondo. A Dismiss button is also included for window withdrawal. 
 
  The Help procedure (ref. Figure 23) includes a scrolled text area that contains a menu bar which 
encompasses the following menu buttons: blender, jondo, headers and flags. Items are added to each of 
these menus and the appropriate information is displayed when the item is activated. 
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Figure 20: Configuration Menus – Main Window 
 
 
Figure 21: Configuration Menus – List Window 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Configuration Menu – Edit Window 
 
 30
 
 
Figure 23: Configuration Menu – Help Window 
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Chapter 4: Anonymous FTP and Crowds 
 
 
 
  As mentioned previously, this software system retrieves only embedded FTP requests.  I am 
developing a graphical  FTP client that can connect to a FTP server, examine the file system  and retrieve 
text and binary files while traversing the Crowds implementation. First, I will discuss the FTP protocol that 
will help to clarify the similarities and differences between the two protocols.  I will continue the discussion 
with an example of an FTP session. Next, I will explicate the functionality of each component in the 
client’s design. The subsequent section will list the commands that will be incorporated in the client 
followed by a description of the server’s responses. Finally, I will describe essential modifications in the 
original software to support the protocol.  
 
 
 
4.1 File Transfer Protocol (Ref. Figure 24) 
 
  FTP is a protocol used to transfer files between computers.  The basic model of FTP , as 
described by the RFC 959 paradigm consists of three components for the client and two for the server. 
 The client components are the user interface, the client protocol interpreter, and the client data transfer 
unit. The server components are the server protocol interpreter and the server data transfer unit. The FTP 
protocol employs two TCP connections, one for the control connection and the other for the data 
connection. The control connection is made between the client and server protocol interpreters and 
similarly the data connection is established between the data transfer units of the client and server.  
 32
 Figure 24: FTP components 
 
   
  The function of the control connection is to send commands to manage directories, transferring 
files, authentication, etc. The data connection is the channel in which the file is actually received or sent. 
The FTP control channel is persistent, it remains open until the interactive session is closed whereas a 
data channel is non-persistent, a new data channel is generated for each file transferred within a session 
and then closed. The FTP client first establishes a TCP control connection with the FTP server on the 
default port of 21. When a data connection is established the default port of 20 is used at the server side. 
Communication over the control connection utilizes client commands and server responses. Each 
command or response is only a short line using the NVT ASCII character set. 
  When communicating over the data connection one must consider that the computers 
exchanging files may have different character sets, file structures, and different file formats. To resolve 
this compatibility issue, the client defines the file type, the data structure, and the transmission mode. 
 
  The acceptable file types in the FTP protocol are ASCII, EBCDIC, and Image. FTP transfers files 
across the data connection using one of the following structures: file structure, record structure, or page 
structure.  The transmission modes utilized by FTP are the stream mode, block mode, or the compressed 
mode. 
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4.2 File Transfer Example (Ref. Figure 25) 
 
When using FTP in file transferring one of three events will occur: 
 A file will be retrieved from the server to the client applying the ‘RETR’ command. 
 A file will be copied to the server from the client utilizing the ‘STOR’ command. 
 A list of directory contents are sent from the server to the client employing the ‘LIST’ command. 
This example will illustrate the retrieval of a directory’s contents from the server’s file system by executing 
the ‘LIST’ command. 
A control connection is established between the server and client using the default port 21. 
The server sends the following message to identify itself: ‘220 linux FTP server (ver...)’. 
The anonymous user starts its login sequence with the message: ‘USER anonymous’. 
The server responds with the message: 331 ‘Guest login OK’ and prompts the user for its password.  
The user submits its  ‘guest’ (or a fictitious (anonymous) email address) for its password, ‘PASS guest’. 
The server responds with the message: ‘230 guest login OK’. 
The client then informs the server of its IP address and the port it will use for data connections on the 
client system: PORT IP address port #. 
The server prepares itself to open the data connection between port 20 (default server side) and the 
Ephemeral port received from the client. 
The server sends the following message indicating this preparation: ‘150 data connection will open soon’. 
The client sends the ‘LIST’ command to display the directory contents. 
The server sends the message: ‘125 Data Connection OK’. 
 
The server subsequently sends the directory contents over the data connection and then the message 
‘226 Directory Send OK, Closing the Data Connection’. 
The client can continue sending FTP commands and receive server responses or terminate the session 
by sending the message ‘QUIT’ to the server. 
The server responds to the ‘QUIT’ command with the message: ‘221 Server Closing GOODBYE’. 
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Figure 25: FTP Transfer Example 
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4.3 File Transfer Protocol Client Design 
 
  The FTP client used in conjunction with the Crowds implementation is a graphical user interface 
that contains the code that applies the FTP and Crowds protocols to establish a connection and transfer 
files from the FTP server. The client’s design will follow the paradigm defined in  RFC 959. It will consist 
of the User Interface, the Client Protocol Interpreter and the Client Data Transfer Protocol. As 
represented in Figure 26 the User Interface in this design will consist of three software elements: Local 
Interface, Remote Interface, and Ascii/Binary. The Client Protocol Interpreter will be implemented with the 
Connect, Handle Incoming Messages and the Command Interpreter sections.  The functionality of the 
Client Data Transfer Protocol will be achieved using the components: Incoming Data Message, Client 
Data Transfer, and Saving File.  
 
Remote Interface
Ascii/Binary
Local Interface
Command Interpreter
Connect
Handle Incoming Messages
Incoming Data Message
Client Data Transfer
Saving File
User
Service Protocol
Interpreter
Service Data 
Transfer
Protocol
File System
File System
User Interface
Client Protocol Interpreter
Client Data Transfer Protocol
 
Figure 26: FTP client 
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 4.3.1 User Interface 
4.3.1.1 Local Interface 
 
  Initially, when the FTP client is executed, the hierarchy of the local file system is displayed 
beginning with the root directory. Any directory in the local file system can be expanded or collapsed, 
revealing or concealing its associated contents. The management of the local file system an be 
accomplished either by graphical means or by using the appropriate buttons on the interface. The 
absolute path to the file or directory is required when using change directory in the local file system. The 
interface will also allow the user to generate a new directory in the local file system. If the entry selected 
is a file or link to a file then the file’s data is subsequently disclosed in a pre-existing window. The local 
interface will generate a display area to accept user input and display server responses (ref. Fig. 27) 
Informational or error messages from the jondo are also displayed in this area. The interface will also 
send the user requests or server responses to the Client Protocol Interpreter for further processing and 
ultimately to the Server Protocol Interpreter. 
 
Figure 27: FTP Client User Interface 
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4.3.1.2 Remote Interface 
  After connection is established with the FTP server, the client will display the remote file system 
in the user interface remote area. Selecting and activating a directory entry displays or conceals the 
directory’s contents. If a file or a link to a file is selected in the remote file system,  the file is stored 
automatically in the current directory of the local file system. 
 
4.3.1.3 ASCII/Binary 
  This FTP client will be able to transfer ASCII files and binary or image files across its data 
connection. In ASCII each character is encoded using ASCII. The image or binary files are sent as 
continuous streams of bits without any interpretation or encoding. The user selects the type of file by 
activating one of the buttons on the user interface. The client will use the default values for file structure 
and transmission mode.   
 
4.3.2 Client Protocol Interpreter  
4.3.2.1 Connect 
  This component of the Client Protocol Interpreter illustrated in Figure 28 functions as the 
connection mechanism to the user’s jondo and ultimately to the FTP server by traversing the dynamically 
generated path of randomly selected jondos. The dialog box provides the user with the ability to insert the 
addresses and ports of the FTP server and it’s jondo, The Dialog Box is activated by the ‘Connect” button 
on the user interface. The initiating message to the server is also transmitted in this routine to initiate the 
FTP session. 
 
Figure 28: FTP Connection Dialog Box 
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4.3.2.2 Handle Incoming Message  
 This software element distinguishes between informational or error messages from the jondo and 
responses from the FTP server. Jondo messages are in HTML format and undergo further processing to 
convert the files to plain text in the display area of the user interface Server responses are sent to the 
Command Interpreter for additional processing 
 
4.3.2.3 Command Interpreter  
 
  The function of this Command Interpreter is to process user requests from the user interface. This 
component also issues commands to the FTP server (Server’s Protocol Interpreter) on the control 
connection, receive numerical reply codes and the associated descriptions from the FTP server, decipher 
these codes and process them accordingly. This element also drives the ‘Client Data Transfer Unit’. 
 
 
4.3.3 Client Data Transfer Unit  
 
The Client Data Transfer Unit receives, processes and stores data from the Server’s Data Unit. 
Using the file type, file structure and transmission mode parameters set up by the client over the control 
connection , the Server Data Unit either sends a list of the contents of a directory or transfers a file from 
the Server’s file system over the data connection to the Client’s Data Unit. In this implementation the Unit 
is composed of the ‘Incoming Data Message’, the ‘Client Data Transfer and the ‘Saving File’ components. 
 
4.3.3.1 Incoming Data Message 
  The routine retrieves and stores messages from the server’s ‘Data Transfer Protocol’ that are 
directories, files, or links.  
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4.3.3.2 Client Data Transfer 
  This component of the transfer unit establishes the data connection and processes the messages 
received from the server’s data unit. 
 
4.3.3.3 Saving File 
  This is the unit that saves files to the current directory of the local file system. 
 
4.3.4 Commands Included in the FTP Client Design 
 
FTP protocol commands sent from the FTP client consists of four uppercase ASCII characters 
followed by optional arguments and can be subdivided into six groups: access commands, file 
management commands, data formatting commands, port defining commands, file transferring 
commands, and other various commands. These commands will be incorporated in this design. 
 
Access commands – The user accesses or terminates its connection with the remote system.  
 
 
File management commands --  Allows the client to access the file system on the remote  
          system. 
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Data formatting commands – Permits the user to select the file type. 
 
 
 
 
 
Port defining commands – Defines the port number for the client’s data connection 
 
 
 
 
 
File transfer commands – Allows the client to transfer files. 
 
 
 
 
 
Other commands – Provides miscellaneous information to the client 
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4.4 FTP Server’s Responses 
 
 
  The server sends at least one response as a result to the client’s command. The response 
consists of two parts: a three digit number and a text part. The first two digits of the numeric part define 
the status of the command. The third digit provides additional information. The text part defines additional 
required parameters or provides descriptive text. 
Response examples:     
200 Command OK 
331 User name OK; password is needed. 
 
 
4.5 Modifications to the Crowds implementation 
 
4.5.1  HTTP modifications 
 
4.5.1.1 Filtering unwanted HTTP headers 
  The program has the ability to filter out the ‘Cookie’ header request to maintain privacy.  Additions 
to the client’s configuration file and a trivial modification to the code would allow the user the ability to 
sanitize other request headers the client may deem necessary to ensure anonymity. The capability to 
remove the following headers was added to the program:  the ‘From’ header, the ‘Referer’ header, and 
the ‘User Agent’ header. The ‘From’ header contains the client’s email address but most browsers do not 
send ‘From’ headers for obvious reasons. The ‘Referer’ header provides the URL of the previously visited 
web page providing a means to build dossiers of the client. The ‘User Agent’ header reveals the name 
and version of the browser and may include the operating system being used. This header would enable 
an attacker to use known weaknesses of the browser or operating system to fulfill its goal. 
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4.5.2  FTP modifications 
 
  The jondo’s(proxy) code must be modified to address the following conditions. The modifications 
are essential to satisfy the FTP protocol and provide access to the FTP server and ensure the reception 
of server responses.  
 
4.5.2.1 Data and Control Connections   
  In this version of Crowds, a connection is opened using the HTTP protocol and terminated after 
each request and the corresponding response. In order to support the FTP protocol the proxy program 
must be modified to ensure the control connection remains open during the entire interactive FTP 
session. To accomplish this task the program has been modified to sustain this connection until the ‘Quit’ 
command from the user has been given. This modification shouldn’t compromise privacy since only user 
commands and server responses travel along this channel. 
 
  In the FTP protocol another connection (data connection) must be generated. The data 
connection opens in conjunction with a file transfer or the ‘LIST’ command and then closes. This 
particular action, the opening and closing of the data connection must occur after each transaction. In the 
HTTP protocol only one connection is required. In the HTTP protocol version 1.0 there is just one 
transaction prior to the connection being terminated. The HTTP protocol connection parallels the data 
connection of the FTP protocol in the sense that after a single transaction occurs the channel is closed. 
The difference lies in the data that is transmitted over the channel, in the HTTP protocol the client’s 
requests consists of the HTTP headers and the body; whereas, in the FTP protocol the user’s requests 
consists of only commands. The response in the HTTP connection involves a web page and in the FTP 
protocol server responses are returned along the channel. The software must be adjusted to recognize 
these differences and accommodate both protocols. 
 
  To preclude a potential attacker from being able to associate multiple paths to a particular jondo, 
static paths were used in the HTTP protocol [6]. 
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 To apply this design concept to the FTP protocol, control and data channels will use the same static path 
to the FTP server to sustain the anonymity properties. The FTP client program and modifications to the 
jondo program provide for this feature. 
 
4.5.2.2 Connection to HTTP server or FTP server 
 
 The code must be modified to distinguish between a connection to a HTTP server versus a FTP 
server. This version of ‘Crowds’ code is based on the HTTP protocol only. Error messages default port 
numbers, etc. pertain to the HTTP protocol only and must be changed to include the FTP protocol. 
 
4.5.2.3 Visual Display Modifications 
  The server program, i.e. the blender, must be modified to include another server that allows each 
jondo to transmit information to the blender so its path can be constructed. Other procedures are added 
to establish the connection object and respond to subsequent messages sent from the jondos. Other 
additions to the code will enable the blender to manipulate databases with data from the jondos to display 
the path for each jondo. The jondo program will provide additional code enabling it to connect to the 
blender and transmit pertinent path information to the blender to store in appropriate databases. 
 
 
4.6 Caveats relative to the Crowds implementation 
Adherence to the following cautions must be heeded to ensure anonymity while using the ‘Crowds’  
system: 
 
 
Obviously the client will only use anonymous authentication to preserve user’s anonymity. 
Any content of the client that reveals the identity of the client would render the system useless.   
 
 
The FTP client will not address FTP commands that modify the server’s file system since most servers  
restrict modification to its file system by an anonymous client. 
 
 
ActiveX , JavaScript, and any other executable code  must be turned off because executable content can  
establish a connection to the server bypassing the ‘Crowds’ implementation. 
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4.7 Empirical data measuring performance for the FTP protocol 
 
  The equipment and software involved in measuring performance in the NSSAL lab  were 
machines with Xeon 3.8GHz Xeon processors running the Centos Linux operating systems. The FTP 
client was employed for this activity and was configured to allow three simultaneous network connections. 
The vsftp server ran on an lightly loaded identical machine running Centos Linux.   Figures 29 show the 
results that the lab achieved while retrieving text files.  The variables in Table 4 are page size(axis y), in 
kilobytes, the path length (number of jondos in the path – axis x) , and the mean latency in 
milliseconds(axis z). Jondos appearing repeatedly on the path are counted for each time they appear in 
the path length. 
 
  Since the path lengths are randomly established at run time, the length of the path to establish a 
performance chart can be obtained with the following formula (pf / 1 – pf) + 2 [6]. The probability of 
forwarding (pf ) can be adjusted in the jondo’s program in the routine ‘handle_proxy_request’. One of the  
jondos or all of them can be changed to obtain the path length desired. The Perl modules Time::HiRes 
and Time::Elapsed were used to measure the times in milliseconds. 
 
  An empirical result that is manifested when the path length increases from one to two results from 
the fact that encryption starts at page length two. When only one jondo is in the crowd that particular 
jondo makes a direct connection to the server and hence encryption does not occur. To impede the 
overhead of encryption a path key is employed. The hindrance to an increase in latency and thus in 
performance results from the path key being able to allow the initiating jondo to encrypt the requests and 
the submitting jondo to decrypt the message. The reversal of this procedure occurs with the server 
responds, the submitting jondo encrypts the replies and the initiating jondo decrypts the message. All of 
the intermediate jondos are not involved  in these cryptographic processes and thus latency is minimized. 
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Figure 29: Performance FTP Graph 
 
 
 93     128     124     147     220     300
  93    128    124    147    220    300
  153  182    299    283    284    405
  186  196    405    387    306    428
  179  200    392    380    332    471
  209  284    399    421    379    489
Page size (kbytes)
   0       1        2        3        4       5
Path
Length
          1
          2
          3
          4
          5
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Performance FTP Data 
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Chapter 5: Visual display of the jondos path 
 
  Initially, each jondo is assigned a unique path identification number upon start-up. Each jondo in 
the path needs to be identified by a unique number to preclude infinite loops. This distinctive property is 
employed to develop code that graphically displays the paths of the jondos.  The elements in the jondo’s 
code used to support this visual system are the original path identifiers, and the Translate and Next 
associative arrays. First, unique identification numbers are assigned to each jondo. Next, before a jondo 
connects to its successor, it is assigned a different identification number randomly selected. 
 
   The new id number for the jondo is stored as the value in the Translate hash with the old path id 
as the key. This process is repeated with each jondo on the path until the server is reached. The 
successor of a jondo is randomly selected from a set of active jondos and is stored in the Next hash with 
the path id number again as the key. 
 
  The visual display system is activated by setting the display attribute in the jondo’s configuration 
file. Initially, the jondo connects to the blender and sends the blender its name and unique id number. 
Subsequently,  the jondo connects and transmits relevant information to the blender whenever it connects 
to itself, to another jondo or to the FTP server. These messages are delimited by the number ‘#’ sign. 
 
  The visual display section of the blender utilizes these messages in conjunction with three 
databases to store pertinent information aiding in the generation of the graphical system. The databases 
include the following information: 1) the initiators’ names and identifiers 2) the jondos’  identifiers and the 
Translate hash and 3) the initiators’  identifiers and a corresponding arrays that stores the jondos in its 
path. 
 
  The processing of the message from the jondo commences by determining the number of 
delimiters contained in the message. One delimiter denotes that this is the initial message. 
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Two delimiters indicate that the message is sent by the submitting jondo.  More than two delimiters 
indicates that this is not the first message or the last message.  
 
  The display system is dynamically constructed by determining if the identification number is one 
of the originating id numbers and if it is, to add the next jondo to its path. If the identification number is not 
one from one of the initiators then the code reverses the direction of the path by using the Translate hash 
until the originator is found, then once again the next jondo is added to this originator’s path. 
 
  The hash of the database file that consists of the initiating jondos and the arrays that contain their 
paths is processed with the URL of the server. The routine uses this data to display the initiators and their 
paths graphically. Initially, the originating jondo is drawn in its own window and a unique color is assigned 
to that jondo. This process is repeated for each jondo in the hash. Next, for each jondo that was selected, 
its window is retrieved, the position and color for the next jondo in it’s path is determined and it is drawn. 
The name of the jondo is also written in the display. After all the jondos in the path are displayed the 
server is also displayed. This process is repeated until all the data in the hash has been displayed. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
  FTP provides the user with access to an abundance of information: software, drivers, graphic 
images, music, various documents etc. Anonymous FTP allows the user access to this wealth of 
information without being an official user of the system. The costs of this anonymity are the access 
restrictions to the server’s file system and the inability to store files to the server. It is assumed that 
receiver anonymity is achieved in anonymous FTP since authentication is absent; but what if the server is 
malicious. Could the server record the IP addresses of the user, the times and frequencies of accesses, 
or other activities unknown to the client. It is clearly seen that sender anonymity and unlinkability are not 
available in this protocol. Truly anonymous FTP could be sought by masking the path using the approach 
provided by Crowds thus providing degrees of sender and receiver anonymity.   
 
  The FTP protocol can be implemented on the Crowds’ system with the security concerns 
remaining intact. Other application programs utilizing TCP should also be able to utilize the system 
providing a source of anonymity while traversing networks 
 
  If a user seeks sender anonymity, receiver anonymity and unlinkabikity  he could use a protocol 
that provides the ability to establish different personae along with the Crowds implementation that masks 
the path to the server. A combination of anonymity agents can be employed to allow a user to choose the 
type and degree of anonymity desired.  
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Chapter 7: Future Work 
 
 
I would complete the command set of the FTP client to enhance the capability of the client. These 
commands would not include those requests that would alter the file system of the remote server, since 
this would be prohibited in an anonymous connection. 
 
In reference to the data connection attributes, i.e. the file type, data structure, and transmission mode, I 
would allow the user to automatically select the file type, expand the data structure to include the ‘record’ 
and ‘page’ structure options, and include the ‘block’ and ‘compressed’ mode as transmission mode 
alternatives. 
 
Additionally, would add more features to the client to be selected by icons, menus, and other cosmetically 
pleasing images to enhance the graphical user interface, thus; providing the user with the ability to 
accomplish various tasks with ease.  
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